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Abstract
In America’s large and severely congested metropolitan areas, carpools and express
bus service could attract many more riders if they could operate between residential
areas and job centers on free-ﬂowing highways that provide premium service opportunities. FAST Miles attempts to eliminate recurring congestion on limited-access
highway systems using a potentially more publicly acceptable form of road pricing,
along with an integrated multimodal strategy to encourage shifts of solo-driving
commuters to alternative modes. FAST Miles allocates to motorists a limited number of free miles for use in peak periods on limited-access highways. Every motorist
would get a share of free peak-period use of FAST highway facilities “already paid for”
through his or her taxes through free FAST Miles credits. Total outstanding credits
would be limited to ensure that the metropolitan highway system does not get congested and that express bus services operate faster, providing better levels of service
at a lower cost.
The concept would include new express bus and carpooling services, improved passenger collection and distribution services at bus transfer stations, free transit trial
periods, web-based multimodal trip-planning programs, and individualized marketing of alternative modes at employment centers and in residential areas. Preliminary
sketch analysis suggests that FAST Miles could be self-ﬁnancing. It also would introduce new possibilities for public-private partnerships.
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Introduction
Several metropolitan planning organizations have proposed networks of premium-service bus/high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes or high-occupancy toll
(HOT) lanes to create free-ﬂowing traﬃc conditions for buses and HOVs. However, funds available to invest in complete networks of such facilities are inadequate due to high costs for highway facility expansion and special direct access
ramps that are needed to provide safe access for buses. For example, a feasibility
study for a network of HOT lanes in the Twin Cities of Minnesota suggests that
tolls could pay for only 15 to 55 percent of the cost of building the lanes (Cambridge Systematics, Inc. and URS Corporation 2005). In some cases, limited rightsof-way and environmental and community impacts preclude highway expansion
altogether, leaving some segments where buses would need to run in mixed traﬃc
on congested highways.
This article presents a new concept called FAST Miles that seeks to create a complete premium-service express bus and HOV network without an immediate need
for highway expansion, while at the same time providing new incentives for HOV
and transit use through improved passenger collection and distribution services
at residential and employment ends of the commute trip. The word FAST in FAST
Miles is not used as an acronym, but simply represents the fast highway service
provided by this concept.

The FAST Miles Concept
One cellular phone plan oﬀered in the United States (i.e., Verizon) allows an unlimited number of free calls during oﬀ-peak periods and weekends, but limits free
minutes on weekdays during the peak daytime period. Customers pay per minute
charges for calls above the free limit during peak periods. The phone company is
able to eliminate daytime congestion. This reduces the need to add expensive new
capacity to serve discretionary calls during peak periods and encourages people to
make these calls during oﬀ-peak times.
This phone service charging concept may be transferable to public services subject
to peak demands, such as transportation. FAST Miles is such a concept. It allocates
to motorists a limited number of free miles for use in peak periods on freewaytype limited-access highways called FAST highways. Every motorist would get a
share of peak-period use of FAST highway facilities “already paid for” through his
or her taxes through free FAST Miles credits. Total outstanding credits are limited
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to ensure that the metropolitan highway system does not get congested and
that express bus services operate faster, providing better levels of service at lower
cost.
All metropolitan-area motorists would be provided with an electronic transponder—a device that would capture miles driven on limited-access highways during the morning and afternoon peak periods. ATM-like machines now dispense
transponders in sticker form for as little as $5 each in Puerto Rico. Out-of-towners
could obtain transponders from such machines at visitor centers or through the
mail. With a nationally coordinated FAST Miles program, “sticker” transponders
could be made available to all motorists nationwide.
Each licensed motorist would get a personal FAST Miles account that would
be replenished daily with free credits for a limited number of free peak-period
highway miles for that day. Additional miles could be purchased at rates that
would depend on congestion levels. Rates per mile would be set high enough to
dissuade discretionary trip-makers from peak-period use. This would help assure
that demand does not exceed supply of congestion-free road space available and
would help prevent the breakdown of the free ﬂow of traﬃc. The extent of the
highway system on which peak-period highway mileage charges would apply
would be determined based on the extent of existing congestion on the system.
Mileage charges would apply only to limited-access FAST highways and only during peak periods. Charges are generally not practical on surface arterials. To charge
for use of surface arterials, transponder readers would generally be needed on
every block to prevent motorists from attempting to evade charges by diverting
to parallel streets at charging points. This would increase implementation costs
signiﬁcantly. Therefore, with FAST Miles, tolls would not be charged on surface
streets at any time of the day.
Congestion levels vary both by highway segment location and by the speciﬁc time
of travel within the peak period. Therefore, free miles would be charged to motorists’ accounts at a discounted rate during those times and on those segments that
have less heavy demand. Conversely, free mile “surcharges” would be applied to
more heavily used segments and at more heavily used times (i.e., motorists would
need to use their free miles at a higher rate than actual miles driven).
Those participating in carpools and vanpools could link their FAST Miles accounts.
This might be accomplished, for example, by registering with the metropolitan
ridesharing agency. This would allow those who currently drive solo in single73
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occupant vehicles (SOVs) and have long commute trips to avail themselves of
additional free miles by sharing the ride. Transit operators could attract longdistance suburban commuters by providing a fare credit equal to the value of
the commuter’s free FAST Miles if the commuter links his or her FAST Miles and
transit fare card accounts.
If desired, trading systems could be set up, so that motorists who do not use their
free miles would be able to cash in on their unused miles (DeCorla-Souza 1994).
However, this would reduce the number of free miles that could be oﬀered to those
who currently use the highways in peak periods, potentially increasing opposition
from them. Also, it may be negatively perceived as providing “windfall proﬁts” to
those who currently do not use the highway system during peak periods.
Long-distance commuters who value their time highly may still choose to drive
alone and pay for extra miles. Surplus revenue from extra-mile payments could
be dedicated to uses that would beneﬁt these commuters. For example, relatively
low-cost improvements such as signal coordination may be implemented on
alternate nonpriced surface streets that long-distance commuters might choose
to use to avoid extra highway mileage charges. Transit operators may be provided
with public subsidies equal to the value of FAST Miles credits turned in to them
by those patrons who commute long distances on transit. FAST highways may be
expanded or transit capacity in the corridor enhanced, whichever is more costeﬀective, to accommodate their higher rates of peak use. Park-and-ride facilities,
pedestrian and bicycle access (including bike rental facilities at bus stations), and
shared-ride taxi services may be provided in suburban residential communities
and at employment centers to facilitate the use of carpools or transit.
Providing incentives for use of non-SOV modes reduces vehicular travel demand.
Those long-distance commuters who choose to drive alone and pay for the privilege will beneﬁt from reduced vehicular travel demand resulting from mode shifts,
because rates they would have to pay for extra miles would be lower. Rates would
be lower because prices needed to eliminate recurring congestion would be lower
when vehicular travel demand is reduced.
The FAST Miles concept would in eﬀect produce what has been termed a “Fast
And Intertwined Regular” (FAIR) highway network—a metropolitan highway
system with two classes of service: a FAST network of free-ﬂowing limited-access
highways allowing for eﬃcient and eﬀective operation of express bus services; and
a regular network of surface arterials (DeCorla-Souza 2005).
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Can Demand for Highway Use Be Reduced?
Traﬃc volume-speed relationships suggest that reducing existing peak-period
highway traﬃc levels by relatively small amounts, as little as 10 percent, can eliminate recurring highway congestion (Transportation Research Board 2000). Drivers
in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area notice this phenomenon in August
when peak-hour traﬃc is reduced by only small amounts due to some commuters being on vacation. Californians observe it on days when only state government
employees are oﬀ work due to a state holiday (Wachs 2003). In such situations,
there is not suﬃcient time for “equilibrium” with regard to traﬃc congestion to be
restored (i.e., people who previously changed their mode, route, or time of travel
choice due to congestion do not immediately get back on the highways during the
peak periods to take advantage of the reduced congestion).
FAST Miles, when combined with improved modal alternatives, would provide a
new incentive for a relatively small number of solo drivers with long commutes to
reduce their highway use during peak periods by seeking alternative commuting
arrangements. Solo drivers whose highway trip lengths exceed their free FAST
Miles allocation would be more likely to consider carpooling, taking transit, telecommuting more often, driving during oﬀ-peak periods or on non-FAST facilities,
or—in the longer term—moving closer to their jobs. Charges for extra miles would
reduce the incentive for others, such as those long-distance commuters who
previously changed their travel behavior due to congestion, to get back on the
highway in peak periods to take advantage of free-ﬂowing traﬃc conditions.
According to a recent Washington Post-ABC News poll (Langer 2005; Washington
Post 2005), one third of those who drive to work alone in the Washington D.C.
metropolitan area say they could take transit but do not. If they were to choose
transit, SOV commuter traﬃc might be reduced by 33 percent. Nationwide, while
just 8 percent of commuters currently carpool, 20 percent of solo drivers say that
they would be interested in it—enough to take at least 10 percent of SOV commute vehicles oﬀ the road, assuming that each solo driver would share the ride
with one other solo driver; or as much as 20 percent if it is assumed that all those
solo drivers would join an existing carpool.
Achieving the relatively small reduction in peak-period traﬃc required to achieve
free-ﬂowing traﬃc conditions might not be as diﬃcult as conventional wisdom
might suggest. The U.S. Department of Transportation’s 2001 National Household Travel Survey (U.S. Department of Transportation 2004) suggests that, in
metropolitan areas with more than half a million people, one-way commute trips
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more than 20 miles long make up only 13 to 17 percent of all commute trips, but
account for 37 to 45 percent of commute miles traveled. If heavy highway usage
by these longer trips can be reduced by one third by encouraging use of transit
and carpooling, this would amount to only about 4 to 6 percent of all commute
trips. But such a relatively small reduction could decrease commute vehicle miles
traveled by 12 to 15 percent, possibly suﬃcient to restore free-ﬂowing traﬃc conditions in peak periods.
The National Household Travel Survey also found that only 50 percent of trips are
work-commute related in the morning peak period, while less than 30 percent
are work-commute related in the afternoon peak. This suggests that many peakperiod trips may be discretionary in nature. These trip-makers may be more easily
dissuaded from using highways during peak periods and may have more ﬂexibility
to shift their time of travel to oﬀ-peak periods. In fact, on a set of two tolled bridges
in Lee County, Florida, when a discount of just 25 cents was oﬀered for travel
before and after the heaviest travel periods, more than 70 percent of motorists
eligible for the discounts chose to shift their time of travel to the discount periods
at least once a week (Berg et al. 1999).

Costs to Implement FAST Miles
Costs for Toll Collection, Credit Distribution, and Trafﬁc Management
Table 1 presents estimates of typical costs to implement FAST Miles in a large
metropolitan area—Washington, D.C. This metropolitan region has about 4 million people. About two thirds of residents are licensed drivers and each driver generates about 3.8 vehicle trips each weekday (U.S. Department of Transportation
1999). Thus, a total of about 10 million vehicle trips are generated each weekday.
Almost 40 percent of travel occurs in peak periods (U.S. Department of Transportation 1999). This means that about 4 million vehicle trips are carried on the
regional highway system in peak periods. At an average trip length of 11.84 miles
(U.S. Department of Transportation 1999), about 48 million vehicle miles of travel
occur on the highway system during the morning and afternoon peak periods.
In Washington, D.C., about 42 percent of travel is carried on limited-access highways (U.S. Department of Transportation 2003). It is estimated that about 20 million vehicle miles are carried on the limited-access highway system in peak periods.
The average distance traveled by the 4 million peak-period trips on the limitedaccess highway system may thus be calculated as almost 5 miles. (This average
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includes some trips that may not use the limited-access highway system at all.)
Conservatively assuming that all of the 4 million trips currently use the limitedaccess highway system for a part of their trip lengths, and that 10 percent of these
trips would shift to alternative modes with FAST Miles, a maximum of about 3.65
million trips would use the highway system daily during peak periods.
Costs for toll collection are estimated at 5 to 10 cents per trip by ITS Decision,
Service and Technologies (2005). Toll collection costs will decrease with large-scale
implementation. However, administration of a FAST Miles system may be more
complex and therefore more costly than a typical toll collection system, due to
dispensing of daily credits, ﬂexible use of credits on transit, etc. Therefore, costs
for the FAST Miles system are estimated at the high end, at about 10 cents per
trip, including costs for traﬃc monitoring and management. Therefore, a FAST
Miles system in Washington, D.C., with 3.65 million peak-period highway trips
would cost about $365,000 per day to operate, or about $91 million over the 250
weekdays each year that the FAST Miles system would be in operation—not an
insigniﬁcant cost.
Table 1 also provides estimates for toll collection capital costs based on cost data
for open road tolling provided by Wilbur Smith & Associates. It is assumed that
the FAST highway network will employ open road tolling, with toll charging points
located at approximately 3-mile intervals along 1,100 lane miles of congested
FAST highway segments in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area (Schrank and
Lomax 2005), resulting in the need for 367 lane-charging points.
Capital costs per lane-charging point are estimated at $46,000 for Electronic Toll
Collection (ETC) costs and $23,500 for Video Enforcement System (VES) costs, or
a total of $69,500 per lane-charging point, resulting in total costs of $25.5 million
for the whole FAST highway network. Video tolling hardware and software, ETC
equipment, system software, communications system, other equipment, and
miscellaneous installation, project management and training costs are estimated
at a total of $16.8 million. Mainline gantry costs are estimated at $25 million and
operations building costs at $2.5 million.
Total capital costs are estimated at $70 million. Annualized at a 7 percent discount
rate and 20-year payback period, these costs amount to about $6.5 million per
year. Total annualized capital and operating costs thus amount to almost $98
million.
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Costs for New Express Bus Service
Estimates of express bus service costs are presented in Table 2. It is assumed that
new express bus service would be introduced during peak periods, from 6 A.M. to
9 A.M. and from 4 P.M. to 7 P.M. (i.e., about six hours a day). It is estimated that this
service would operate on the approximately 300 miles of limited-access highways
in Washington, D.C. (i.e., about 600 route miles for both directions), at an average
frequency of one bus every three minutes (i.e., an average of 20 buses an hour). It is
assumed that each bus would travel an additional 20 percent of route miles oﬀ the
freeway network to pick up and drop oﬀ passengers. Total revenue miles of service
each day would be 86,400 route miles. Assuming an average bus speed (including
intermediate stops for pick ups and drop oﬀs) of 20 mph, total revenue hours of
service per day would be 4,320.
At an average bus speed of 20 mph, each bus would serve 120 revenue miles each
day. Operating 86,400 revenue miles each day would require 720 buses. At a cost
of about $340,000 per bus (American Public Transit Association 2005), capital
costs for buses would be $245 million, or an annualized cost of about $35 million
assuming a 7 percent discount rate and 10-year bus life.
Based on cost data for Seattle, Washington (McDonald 2003), bus operating costs
for a typical large metropolitan area may be estimated at $90 per revenue hour.
Due to the higher labor costs for split shifts and use of part-time labor for peakperiod service, costs for a typical express bus network are estimated to be from 1
to 10 percent higher than for conventional operations (Charles River Associates
2001), or a maximum of about $100 per revenue hour. Operating costs would be
$432,000 per day or about $108 million per year assuming weekday operations
only (i.e., 250 days per year excluding holidays).
Total annualized costs for capital and operation of new express service are thus
estimated at about $143 million. This estimate does not include infrastructure
costs for bus stops and shelters, bus storage, and maintenance facilities, etc. However, some cost savings would be realized with regard to operation of the existing
transit system. Also, some existing transit infrastructure could be utilized for the
new system.
Assuming a 10 percent reduction in peak-period vehicle trips due to pricing, a
total of 0.4 million SOV trips would need to be shifted to either transit or HOV.
Assuming that half of these trips are carried on transit, with the remaining shifting
to carpools, about 0.2 million new transit person trips would need to be served.
At an average transit passenger trip distance of 10 miles, 2 million passenger miles
79

Table 2. Costs for Express Bus Service

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2006

80

Improving Metropolitan Transportation Eﬃciency

would be served. A shorter average transit trip length relative to auto trip length
(i.e., 11.84 miles) was assumed to account for the additional driving distance for
park-and-ride transit trips. On average, 23 passengers would be served per bus
mile (i.e., 2 million passenger miles/86,400 revenue miles per day).
Revenues from transit passengers, conservatively assuming a fare of $1.00 per trip,
would amount to about $200,000 per day, or about $50.6 million per year for 250
days of service. Net annual transit agency costs per year would be about $93 million.

Financial Feasibility
Table 3 presents estimates of potential toll revenue. As estimated above, FAST
highways in Washington, D.C., would carry about 3.65 million peak-period highway trips, generating about 18 million vehicle miles per day. Assuming a set-aside
of 3 million vehicle miles (i.e., about 17%) for purchase by those who need extra
miles, including nonresidents who would not be eligible for a free allocation, about
15 million miles would be traveled for free. Far more free miles could be oﬀered to
motorists, however, since many drivers will likely not use all their free miles during
peak hours.
The average rate that solo drivers are charged during peak periods for use of the
HOT lanes on I-15 in San Diego is about 25 cents per mile (i.e., about $2.00 for the
8-mile trip) based on annual revenue of about $2.4 million and an average of 5,000
paying solo driver trips on each of 250 weekdays (U.S. Department of Transportation 2004). Paying drivers are only a small fraction of the approximately 55,000
auto drivers who use I-15 during the AM and PM peak periods each weekday
(Supernak 2001). Like paying I-15 HOT lane users, many paying FAST highway
motorists would be comparing travel times on alternate free routes with travel
times on FAST highways in deciding whether to use FAST highways. However,
they may be willing to pay higher toll rates for extra miles, because traveling an
extra mile may allow them to avail of additional “free” travel time savings through
use of their FAST Miles credits. For the purpose of revenue estimation, we may
conservatively assume an average charge of 25 cents per mile (comparable to I15) for each of the 3 million extra miles available for purchase under a FAST Miles
system. Thus, tolls paid for extra miles would bring in $750,000 daily, or about $188
million annually, over 250 weekdays. This amount is comparable to the total costs
of about $191 million estimated above for operating the FAST Miles program,
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including costs for toll collection, credit distribution and traﬃc management (i.e.,
about $98 million annually) and costs for new express bus service (i.e., about $93
million annually).
However, there would be concomitant fuel tax revenue losses to state and Federal
governments due to reductions in fuel consumption. This would result from the
reduction in vehicle miles traveled as well as elimination of excess fuel consumption that previously resulted from stop-and-go traﬃc on the highways. At the
current average state and Federal total fuel tax rate of about 40 cents per gallon
and fuel eﬃciency of about 20 miles per gallon, these revenue losses are estimated
at about $20 million annually. This estimate assumes that the daily reduction of
0.4 million vehicle trips would result from a shift to carpools and transit with an
average of 10 miles of the total previous SOV trip length of 11.84 miles carried on
the carpool and transit portions of the commute trip. It also ignores reduced fuel
consumption due to free-ﬂowing traﬃc conditions.

Beneﬁts from FAST Miles
With FAST Miles, the entire limited-access highway system would serve the purpose of a “ﬁxed guideway” for transit. HOVs would get premium service free of
charge on FAST highways when those participating in a carpool link together their
FAST Miles accounts. Therefore, the need for tax dollars to support public investment in special express bus and HOV lanes would be eliminated, including costs
for additional pavement and rights-of-way for new special-purpose bus/HOV
lanes, for lane separation, for special ramps to provide access to and egress from
the lanes, and for enforcement of vehicle occupancy requirements for carpools.
Maximum vehicle ﬂow on limited-access highways occurs when highway speeds
are 55 to 65 mph (Chen and Varaiya 2002). Vehicle throughput on a severely
congested freeway may be reduced signiﬁcantly due to the increase in vehicle
density and the concomitant drop in speeds. When traﬃc volumes reach a certain threshold level—approximately 2,000 vehicles per lane per hour or a vehicle
density of about 35 vehicles per lane per mile—traﬃc ﬂow breaks down, and
speed as well as vehicle throughput decrease precipitously. This has been termed
“the freeway congestion paradox” (Chen and Varaiya 2002). Even though demand
may decrease after the peak period, the highway does not recover its full vehicle
throughput capability until much later, because queued vehicles from previous
hours keep vehicle density high and speeds slow. By ensuring that traﬃc ﬂow does
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not break down in the ﬁrst instance, FAST Miles may actually increase highway
vehicle throughput in peak periods.
The variably tolled express lanes in the median of SR 91 in Orange County, California, demonstrate the ability of pricing to maximize highway throughput by
keeping traﬃc at free-ﬂow speeds. Speeds are 60 to 65 mph on the priced express
lanes. In the peak hour, they carry almost as many vehicles as do the congested
free lanes even though there are twice as many free lanes (U.S. Department of
Transportation 2004). Pricing the express lanes allows twice as many vehicles to be
served per lane in the peak hour, at three to four times the speed on the free lanes.
Almost half the public investment in SR 91’s free lanes is simply wasted in peak
hours. FAST Miles, however, can restore to full use the public investment that is
being wasted every day in major metropolitan areas on congested highways, during critical times of the day when the investment is most needed.
A rough idea of the magnitude of travel time savings beneﬁts to motorists on FAST
highways may be obtained by a few simple calculations, as demonstrated in Table
4. When there are no incidents or accidents, typical speeds on highways in a large
metropolitan area such as Washington, D.C., average 40 miles per hour in the peak
periods (Saﬁrova et al. 2003). FAST Miles would restore free-ﬂow speeds averaging
60 miles per hour, except when collisions or incidents block traﬃc. Under normal
conditions, this means that an average 5-mile limited-access highway trip would
save a half-minute per mile, or 2.5 minutes over its entire trip length. Metropolitan
areas are forecasted to experience increasing levels of congestion in the future. If
average peak-period speeds were to drop to 30 mph (from the current 40 mph
average), time savings to FAST highway motorists would double to 1 minute per
mile driven, or 5 minutes over a 5-mile FAST highway trip.
The U.S. Department of Transportation (2002) estimates that an hour of travel
time is valued at an average of about $12 for all types of personal travel (or about
$11.20 in 2000 dollars). Thus, a single 5-mile highway trip would save about $0.50
in travel time costs today based on 2.5 minutes saved, and as much as $1.00 in the
future based on 5 minutes saved. The 3.65 million FAST highway trips would save
$1.8 million to $3.6 million per day, or almost $0.5 billion to $1 billion over 250
weekdays each year—not an insigniﬁcant beneﬁt, and several times the estimated
costs for implementing and operating FAST Miles.
Eliminating recurring congestion would also have additional beneﬁts for express
bus riders. The reliability of both transit and highway trip times would increase
signiﬁcantly. The value of travel time reliability has been estimated at 100 percent
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to 250 percent of the value of travel time savings (Brownstone and Small 2003; HLB
Decision Economics Inc. and University of California at Irvine 2001). Eliminating
recurring congestion will tend to reduce other delays, such as those caused by incidents, accidents, and road construction, since queues caused by such events will
be shorter. Also, fuel consumption would be reduced. Thus, if beneﬁts to transit
riders, and additional beneﬁts to motorists in the form of fuel savings, accident
savings, and travel time reliability improvements are accounted for, total beneﬁts
to travelers on the FAST network would exceed by far the beneﬁts estimated
above based on motorist travel time savings alone.
Long-distance travelers who change their travel behavior in response to implementation of FAST Miles may suﬀer some disbeneﬁts. Those travelers that respond by
changing their travel route may also cause additional delays to other motorists
on those routes. The key to ensuring that these disbeneﬁts are minimized is to
ensure that levels of service on alternative modes (mainly transit and HOV) are
enhanced as much as possible so that the aggregate “disutility” of cost, travel time,
and inconvenience of these modes (including access and egress) is no higher than
the aggregate disutility of cost, travel time, and inconvenience of driving alone on
congested highways prior to establishment of FAST Miles.
Disbeneﬁts may also accrue to those priced oﬀ the FAST highways and those using
parallel alternative routes in the vicinity of FAST highways, due to added delays
that may result from diversions to these routes. However, negative impacts from
traﬃc diversion can be minimized through use of surplus FAST Miles revenue
for investments in advanced arterial signal systems. This will help accommodate
traﬃc diversions, if any. Due to increased vehicle throughput on free-ﬂowing freeways, however, diversions from arterials to FAST highways may exceed any diversions from FAST highways to arterials. Empirical evidence from SR 91, as discussed
earlier, suggests that the higher throughput on the two priced lanes (per direction) allows more traﬃc to be carried through the corridor than would have been
possible if all six lanes (per direction) were free. Since FAST highways are expected
to carry more vehicles than they did under congested conditions, the burden of
traﬃc on parallel arterials may actually be reduced.
As travel demand increases in the future, extra mile charge rates will also rise,
providing more FAST Miles revenue—and making appropriate investments in
highway expansion and transit and HOV services, including access to and egress
from transfer locations, more ﬁnancially feasible.
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By reducing vehicular travel, FAST Miles would lead to lower automobile pollutant
emissions and improve metropolitan air quality. Urban sprawl may be discouraged if people choose to live closer to their jobs in order to reduce FAST Miles
charges, rather than choosing to live far from urban centers to take advantage of
free highways and lower housing prices, as many do now.
On the other hand, the choice to live further away from dense urban centers may
become more appealing to some as a result of the provision of new express bus
services and ancillary access and egress improvements, new opportunities to form
carpools, an increase in FAST highway vehicle throughput due to elimination of
high levels of recurring congestion, and improved levels of highway service due to
elimination of traﬃc ﬂow breakdowns. Creation of new transportation capacity,
whether through new transit and HOV investments or through elimination of
ineﬃciencies on the existing highway system, does have the potential to induce
new development further away from city centers.
To reduce this eﬀect, it will be important for government agencies to forewarn
those choosing to live far from urban centers that FAST Miles charges for extra
miles may increase in future, especially if new transportation capacity does not
keep pace with growth in peak-period vehicular travel demand. This is exactly the
situation currently being experienced with regard to toll rates on the SR 91 express
lanes in Orange County. The facility serves commuters from the rapidly growing
suburban community of Riverside County, and maximum toll rates for the 10-mile
segment have increased from about $2.50 10 years ago to almost $8.00 today due
to rapid growth in travel demand in the corridor.

Public Acceptance
How will the public react to FAST Miles charges? Table 5 presents the major public
acceptance issues associated with road pricing and how FAST Miles attempts to
address them.
The public appears to have little conﬁdence in the eﬀectiveness of adjustable
tolling as a traﬃc reduction strategy. The Washington Post-ABC News poll cited
earlier (Langer 2005) found that only 7 percent of people believe that such tolling
is very eﬀective as a traﬃc remedy. However, carpooling and transit are believed
to be very eﬀective by 39 percent and 42 percent of people, respectively. Since
FAST Miles is an integrated multimodal strategy that would include signiﬁcant
incentives for carpooling and transit, the public may have greater conﬁdence in
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Table 5. Public Concerns

the eﬀectiveness of FAST Miles. While only 29 percent of those surveyed favor
adjustable tolls, 51 percent support HOV lanes (Langer 2005). With FAST Miles,
the entire highway system would, in eﬀect, be transformed into an HOV system
that provides premium service for HOVs, express buses, and paratransit services.
Therefore, the FAST Miles concept may get a higher level of support from the
public than adjustable mileage charges by themselves would.
However, some people may still oppose the “new” charges, especially those who
currently drive alone for long distances. Their concerns may be alleviated somewhat by guaranteeing that no charges will be made to their FAST Miles accounts
for any miles for which they did not get congestion-free service.
Some may be concerned about the new ability of the government to monitor their
vehicle movements. These public concerns may be alleviated if a private operator
is hired to run the system and the government does not control the data, as in
the case of credit card companies. Additionally, the private operator could be
required to discard all data daily at the end of the afternoon peak period, saving
only the gross amount of money charges incurred by each account holder on
that day. Motorists may request that their daily usage data be forwarded to them
electronically at the end of each day before being erased from the system, so they
could check for accuracy of charges.
Will elected oﬃcials and the public perceive FAST Miles as equitable? Road pricing schemes that have been implemented to date tend to require motorists to
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bear new charges if they want to avail themselves of premium highway service.
Consequently, premium-service facilities, such as the SR 91 express lanes in Orange
County, California, have disproportionately higher use by high-income motorists
(U.S. Department of Transportation 2004). On the other hand, with FAST Miles
most highway travelers would be guaranteed a reliable and congestion-free trip
for free, with all motorists allocated an equal number of free miles regardless of
income level. If a trading system were put in place to permit buying and selling of
FAST Miles credits, low-income motorists, who tend to drive fewer miles, could
cash in on their unused miles. If some revenues were dedicated to subsidizing bus
service, which is used more often by low-income travelers, this would also enhance
equity.
With FAST Miles, those who have long commute trips and choose to continue to
drive solo would, through charges for extra miles, pay for highway capacity expansion to accommodate their more intense usage, or to accommodate some travel
demand on transit and in carpools, including costs for access and egress improvements at transit stations and carpool park-and-ride facilities. Shifts in mode of
travel encouraged by these improvements would free up existing highway capacity to accommodate the remaining long vehicle trips more eﬃciently. The rest of
the public would not have to pay for disproportionately higher demands placed
on the highway system in peak periods by a few trip-makers —either through congestion delays imposed upon them, as under the existing system; or through new
taxes or tolls that are often proposed to pay for new capacity to relieve that congestion. Opposition to new charges based on the perception of “double taxation”
would be weakened. Every motorist would get a share of peak-period use of FAST
highway facilities “already paid for” through his or her taxes. Those who would like
to avail of greater use would have a choice to do so by paying for it.
Won’t commuters with longer trips simply divert to free roadways and cause additional congestion on them, infuriating local residents? The public is well aware that
when tolls are raised on existing tollways, some drivers divert to free alternatives.
However, FAST Miles does not simply involve new charges; a package of reasonably convenient transit and HOV options is included to make simple diversion
to free roadways less appealing to the solo driver. Research by Washbrook (2002)
suggests that, while improvements in travel time for carpools and transit by themselves do not generally achieve a high level of mode shift, these improvements can
be extremely eﬀective when combined with an increase in charges for road use or
parking. When new highway charges are combined with carpooling and transit
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improvements, traﬃc may actually be reduced on parallel arterials because some
arterial travelers who were previously deterred by freeway congestion may shift
back to free-ﬂowing FAST highways whose vehicle throughput has increased (as
on the SR 91 express lanes), at the same time that corridor vehicular demand is
reduced due to increased use of alternative modes.

Public-Private Partnership Possibilities
A new model for partnerships with the private sector could be used to implement and operate FAST Miles and supporting transit and carpool systems. Private
operators of FAST highways could be paid by public agencies based on the number
of free-ﬂowing vehicle miles of travel provided in peak periods, with appropriate
reductions in fees for those vehicle miles that are not congestion-free (DeCorlaSouza and Barker 2005). For example, the private partner may be paid for a vehicle
trip carried at 45 mph on the facility at three quarters of the rate that would apply
if the trip were carried at 60 mph. Operators would thus have an incentive to
ensure that the entire pricing scheme is set up to optimize vehicle throughput on
the highway system at the highest speeds.
All revenues from extra mileage charges would go to public agencies. Thus, private
operators would have no incentive to keep extra mile rates higher than they need
to be for the purpose of managing demand, and would instead have an incentive
to keep the rates as low as possible to maximize use without degrading levels of
service. Potential private operators could be selected based on open competition.
Criteria for selection could include the lowest fee per free-ﬂowing vehicle mile
they would be willing to accept as compensation for their services.
Technologies to count vehicle occupants (such as through heat sensing) are currently in the experimental stage. In the future, as such technologies come to market, it may be possible to enter into more comprehensive agreements with private
sector toll and transit operations consortiums to manage the entire multimodal
transportation system. The consortium would be paid for performance with
respect to the metropolitan community’s goal of maximizing mobility and access.
Fees would be based on the number of persons carried on FAST highways and their
speed of travel during peak periods. This would provide an incentive to the private
sector to make the most cost-eﬃcient modal investments and to promote and
encourage ridesharing and transit use. An example of such a private operation,
with a public sector role in planning, regulation, and monitoring, may be seen in
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Rome, Italy. The city’s public transport and private automobile mobility services
have been combined into a single private company called ATAC (translated in
English as Agency for Bus and Rail Transport in the Municipality of Rome). Private
automobile mobility services provided by this company include normal highwayrelated Intelligent Transportation System services as well as the operation of the
downtown access control system, which charges fees for private vehicle entry into
Rome’s historic district to control congestion and air pollution.
To encourage increased private provision of new transit services, private operators
of transit services could be made eligible for subsidies based on FAST Mile credits
turned in by their patrons. For example, assuming a market value of 25 cents per
credit mile, if a patron turned in 10 free miles per day from his or her FAST Miles
account, the transit operator would be eligible for a total public payment of $2.50
per day (i.e., $1.25 per one-way trip). Private entrepreneurs would thus have incentives to establish targeted paratransit or vanpool services to cater to the needs of
long-distance commuters. These incentives may be particularly appropriate in
markets where existing public transportation is inadequate.
Private provision of services for access and egress at transit stations and carpool
transfer locations may be encouraged by allowing the use of FAST Miles credits as
payment for service, with reimbursements provided by the public sector. Private
businesses may be encouraged to establish and operate bike rental services, shuttle bus services, and shared-ride taxi services at transit transfer locations, if FAST
Miles credits can be used by their customers to pay for their services.

Phasing In FAST Miles
It is important that an enhanced transit system be in place before the FAST Miles
credit/charging program goes into operation. Introducing monetary prices for
rush-hour use of highways by itself will have a very limited impact if transit travel
options are not already available and well understood by the traveling public. This
may present a “chicken-and-egg” problem with regard to funding, since transit
investments will need to be made and services will need to be established before
revenues from FAST Miles operation begin to kick in. Thus, it will be important
to secure in advance the public funding needed. A possible source might be the
issuance of bonds backed by the future stream of revenues after FAST Miles implementation.
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However, the critical time advantages needed for success of transit services are difﬁcult to provide before free-ﬂowing traﬃc conditions are created by FAST Miles.
Creative ways to develop travel time advantages for transit may be needed. One
potential solution is to establish an extra transit lane on proposed FAST highways
by restriping the highway to allow shoulder use as a transit lane, during rush hours.
For example, a “rush-hour lane” has been implemented on I-66 outside Washington, D.C.’s Beltway, and such rush-hour lanes are more extensively used in the
Netherlands.
With bus lanes and express bus services in place in advance of FAST Miles implementation, commuters will have an opportunity to understand and experience
some of the travel time advantages that a full-ﬂedged FAST Miles system might
provide after the entire highway is free-ﬂowing. To increase public understanding of the new and enhanced transit system, it will be important to implement
complementary travel demand management programs, such as:
• Free transit trial periods (as in Seattle, Washington)
• Web-based pre-trip planning programs (as in the Netherlands) that allow
commuters to compare the door-to-door travel times and costs of alternative modal combinations, as well as alternative start times for their commute
trips
• Individualized marketing programs (such as in Lund, Sweden), where commuters are visited in their homes or at their job sites by transportation
advisors who discuss the various travel options available to them

Concluding Thoughts
FAST Miles attempts to use free market principles on highway systems to encourage transit and HOV use and to eliminate recurring highway congestion. There
appears to be suﬃcient discretionary use of solo driving on the highway system
to induce signiﬁcant changes in motorists’ travel choices. This could reduce
vehicle demand below the volumes at which highway traﬃc ﬂow breaks down.
While implementation and operating costs could be signiﬁcant, beneﬁts in a large
metropolitan area could exceed public costs for operating FAST Miles by several
orders of magnitude. Also, FAST Miles could be self-ﬁnancing. It could introduce
new possibilities for public-private partnerships for the eﬃcient and eﬀective
provision of transportation services, including highway and bus operations, and
passenger collection and distribution services.
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New road user charges would be packaged with incentives for transit and carpool
use, which have higher levels of public support than road pricing by itself. FAST
Miles would provide an equal amount of premium service free of charge to motorists of all income levels and impose new charges for use of existing highways on
only those who choose to use highways far more than others during peak times
when highway space is scarce. However, concerted eﬀorts will need to be made
to involve the public in the detailed development of the concept to alleviate their
concerns. FAST Miles and its beneﬁts are complex and diﬃcult to explain in a
sound byte.
Metropolitan Planning Organizations may be best positioned to conduct the type
of extensive public involvement needed to alleviate the public’s concerns and to
develop more detailed concepts with public participation. A pilot demonstration
of the concept may be needed to convince the public of its merits. Implementing
FAST Miles will be no easy task. The highly successful congestion-charging scheme
established in central London in 2003 is smaller in scale than a regionwide application of FAST Miles would be. Yet it took many years of preparation, bold political
leadership, and a favorable institutional setting to establish the central London
scheme.
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